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Abstract
We study a model where a capital provider learns from the price of a ¯rm's security
in deciding how much capital to provide for new investment. This feedback e®ect from
the ¯nancial market to the investment decision gives rise to trading frenzies, where
speculators all wish to trade like others, generating large shifts in prices and ¯rms'
investments. Coordination among speculators is sometimes desirable for price infor-
mativeness and investment e±ciency, but speculators' incentives push in the opposite
direction, so that they coordinate exactly when it is undesirable. We analyze the de-
terminants of coordination among speculators and study policy measures that a®ect
patterns of coordination to improve price informativeness and investment e±ciency.
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Trading frenzies in ¯nancial markets occur when many speculators rush to trade in the
same direction leading to large price changes. Financial economists have long been search-
ing for the sources of trading frenzies, asking what causes strategic complementarities in
speculators' behavior. After all, the price mechanism in ¯nancial markets naturally leads
to strategic substitutes, whereby the change in price caused by speculators' trades pushes
others to trade in the opposite direction. We argue in this paper that the potential e®ect that
¯nancial-market trading has on the real economy may provide the mechanism for trading
frenzies to arise.
For example, consider two prime events of the recent ¯nancial crisis { the fall of Bear
Stearns and the fall of Lehman Brothers. In both events, the shares of the ¯rms were subject
to a massive `run' by short sellers, which most likely contributed to the collapse of these ¯rms,
given that their deteriorating stock prices made it impossible for them to raise new capital.1
In the presence of such a real e®ect, speculators know that the decrease in price caused by
the `run' on a ¯rm's stock will decrease the ¯rm's value. They then want to join the massive
short-selling when it happens, so that they can pro¯t from having a short position on a ¯rm
whose value is about to decline. This can ignite a frenzy.
Building on a recent literature that studies the feedback e®ect from ¯nancial markets to
real investments (reviewed below), we develop a model that studies this phenomenon. In
our model, a capital provider has to decide how much capital to provide to a ¯rm for the
purpose of making new real investment. The decision of the capital provider depends on
his assessment of the productivity of the proposed investment. In his decision, the capital
provider uses the available private information and also the information conveyed by the
price of the ¯rm's traded asset as determined in the ¯nancial market. The reliance of capital
provision on ¯nancial-market prices establishes the feedback e®ect that the ¯nancial market
has on the real economy. In the ¯nancial market, many small speculators trade a security,
whose payo® is correlated with the cash °ow obtained from the ¯rm's investment. Each
speculator makes a trading decision based on two signals: the ¯rst signal is independent
across speculators (conditional on the realization of the productivity), while the second one
1Indeed, these events and others have led regulatory authorities in various countries to become very
concerned about speculative trading and eventually to put restrictions on short selling activities. In executing
a naked-shortsale-ban order on July 15, 2008, the SEC concluded that short sales have exacerbated a loss
of investor con¯dence and caused further panic selling making counterparties to Bear Stearns unwilling to
make secured funding (see: http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58166.pdf).
1is correlated among them.2
The weights that speculators put on each of the two signals are determined by two
strategic e®ects. The ¯rst e®ect is the usual one that arises due to the price mechanism. The
sale (purchase) of securities by other speculators reduces (increases) the price and then the
pro¯t from selling (buying) the securities. This generates strategic substitutes { speculators
wish to act di®erently from one another by reducing the weight they put on the correlated
signal. The second e®ect arises due to the feedback e®ect from the price to the capital
provision decision. A coordinated sale (purchase) by many speculators transmits negative
(positive) information to the capital provider and leads to a reduction (an increase) in the
amount of capital provided and in the amount of investment undertaken. This reduces
(increases) the underlying value of the security and increases the pro¯t from selling (buying).3
The result is strategic complementarities that make speculators put a larger weight on the
correlated signal.
This second e®ect is what causes a trading frenzy, leading speculators to put too much
weight on their correlated information, and to trade in a coordinated fashion. When this
e®ect dominates, our model generates a pattern that echoes the events mentioned above.
Essentially, our model gives rise to a `run' on a stock by many speculators, who are driven
by common noise in their correlated signals (e.g. rumor), leading to a price decline, lack of
provision of new capital, and collapse of real value.
Our paper analyzes when trading frenzies are expected to occur. We ¯nd that when there
is small variance in noise/liquidity trading in the ¯nancial market, i.e., when liquidity dries
up, speculators tend to put large weights on their correlated signals and thus to act in a coor-
dinated fashion. This is because in these situations the ability to a®ect the capital provider's
beliefs improves and hence the incentive to trade in a coordinated way to a®ect the capital
provision decision increases. The information environment also plays an important role in
shaping the incentive to coordinate. Generally speaking, there will be more coordination
when speculators' correlated signals are sharper, when their uncorrelated signals are noisier,
2In our model, the correlation is perfect, but this is for expositional clarity and is not essential.
3The setup of the model assumes that speculators holding a long position in the security always bene¯t
from more real investment, while the capital provider faces a tradeo® in choosing the investment level. As
a result, the model generates symmetric implications for buy-side speculation pushing investment up and
sell-side speculation pushing investment down. In this, our model is di®erent from the model by Goldstein
and Guembel (2008), which is discussed below. There, speculators who hold a long position are aligned
with the manager who decides on real investment, and as a result buy-side and sell-side speculations are
asymmetric. Our model may capture better a situation with con°ict of interests, that is, where the provider
of capital and speculators face di®erent tradeo® in making their corresponding investment decisions.
2when the capital provider has less precise information of his own, and when there is overall
more uncertainty about the ¯rm's productivity.
Interestingly, speculators' incentives to coordinate go in the opposite direction to e±-
ciency considerations (from the point of view of the capital provider's investment decision).4
Providing the most informative signal from the market to the capital provider entails higher
coordination among speculators when there is a lot of liquidity trading and lower coordi-
nation when liquidity dries up. This is because, in liquid markets, coordination among
speculators is bene¯cial in suppressing the noise in liquidity trading that reduces the infor-
mativeness of the price. In such markets, trading frenzies among speculators are actually
desirable because they enable decision makers to detect some trace of informed trading in
a market subject to large volume of liquidity and noise. On the other hand, when liquid-
ity dries up, the importance of coordination among speculators declines, and the additional
noise that coordination adds via the excess weight that speculators put on their correlated
information (which translates into weight on common noise) makes coordination undesirable.
Hence, given speculators' own incentives (as described above), they end up coordinating their
trading too much in illiquid markets and too little in liquid markets.
This disparity between speculators' incentives and investment e±ciency suggests a role
for policy measures to improve the usefulness of ¯nancial markets in guiding investment
decisions. One of the main policy tools available to policymakers is the control over the cost
of capital for the capital provider. The government can a®ect the cost of capital by changing
the interest rate and/or the availability of funds. Our analysis shows that such policy can
have an important e®ect on the informativeness of prices and the e±ciency of investments if
it is made contingent on the realization of fundamentals. A policy that reduces the cost of
capital when fundamentals are weak and increases it when fundamentals are strong reduces
the sensitivity of investment to the perceived strength of the fundamental and thus weakens
the real e®ect of ¯nancial-market trading. This mitigates the incentive of speculators to
coordinate, and hence is useful when the ¯nancial market is illiquid. Conversely, a policy
that reduces the cost of capital in good times and increases it in bad times would be desirable
when the ¯nancial market has high volume of liquidity trading.
Other policy measures target the trading environment in the ¯nancial market. A very
intuitive measure based on the discussion above is to a®ect the amount of liquidity/noise
trading in the market. Increasing (decreasing) liquidity when it is low (high) will reduce
(increase) coordination and improve e±ciency. The government can also attempt to achieve
4Focusing on the investment decision for the e±ciency criterion is appropriate if we think of the ¯nancial
market as a zero-sum game.
3more e±cient levels of coordination by a®ecting the informational environment. Reduction
in coordination can be achieved by releasing public information that reduces uncertainty
about investment productivity, by restricting communication among speculators to reduce
the correlation in their information, and by providing capital providers unique access to
better information.5
As mentioned above, our paper builds on a small, but growing, branch of models in
¯nancial economics that consider the feedback e®ect from trading in ¯nancial markets to
corporate investments. The basic motivation for this literature goes back to Hayek (1945),
who posited that market prices provide an important source of information for various de-
cision makers. Empirical evidence for this link is provided by Baker, Stein, and Wurgler
(2003), Luo (2005), and Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007). On the theoretical side, ear-
lier contributions to this literature include Fishman and Hagerty (1992); Leland (1992);
Khanna, Slezak, and Bradley (1994); Boot and Thakor (1997); Dow and Gorton (1997);
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999); and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001).
Several recent papers in this literature are more closely related to the mechanism in our
paper. Ozdenoren and Yuan (2008) show that the feedback e®ect from asset prices to the real
value of a ¯rm generates strategic complementarities. In their paper, however, the feedback
e®ect is modeled exogenously and is not based on learning. As a result, their paper does not
deliver the implications that our paper delivers on the e®ect of liquidity and various informa-
tion variables on coordination and e±ciency. Khanna and Sonti (2004) also model feedback
exogenously and show how a single trader can increase the value of his existing inventory in
the stock by trading to a®ect the value of the ¯rm. Goldstein and Guembel (2008) do analyze
learning by a decision maker, and show that this might lead to manipulation of the price by
a single potentially informed trader. Hence, the manipulation equilibrium in their paper is
not a result of strategic complementarities among heterogeneously informed traders. Dow,
Goldstein, and Guembel (2007) show that the feedback e®ect generates complementarities
in the decision to produce information, but not in the trading decision.6 In di®erent con-
texts, Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2009) and Angeletos, Lorenzoni, and Pavan (2007)
5Our ¯nding that releasing public signals unambiguously reduces coordination, di®ers from that in the
existing literature. The reason is that in our paper the coordination incentive among speculators is endoge-
nous and stems from the speculators' wish to a®ect the capital provider's inference. More public information
reduces uncertainty and the room for speculators to a®ect the capital provider's inference becomes limited.
Hence, there is less incentive for speculators to coordinate.
6Complementarities in the decision to produce information also arise due to other reasons in several other
papers. For example see, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992); Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman
(1994); Bru and Vives (2002); and Veldkamp (2006a and 2006b).
4also study learning-based complementarities. More generally, our paper is the ¯rst one to
derive a closed-form solution in a model with endogenous feedback, where prices aggregate
information from heterogeneously informed agents and re°ect the expected investment. As
described in the body of the paper, we are able to achieve this methodological innovation by
working with log-normal distributions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model
setup and characterize the equilibrium of the model. In Section 3, we solve the model.
Section 4 analyzes the determinants of coordination among speculators in our model. In
Section 5, we discuss the implications for the e±ciency of investments and the volatility of
prices and investments. In Section 6, we discuss policy implications. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
The model has one ¯rm and a traded asset. There is a capital provider who has to decide
how much capital to provide to the ¯rm for the purpose of making an investment. There
are three dates, t = 0;1;2. At date 0, speculators trade in the asset market based on their
information about the fundamentals of the ¯rm. At date 1, after observing the asset price
and receiving private information, the capital provider of the ¯rm decides how much capital
the ¯rm can have and the ¯rm undertakes investment accordingly. Finally, at date 2, the
cash °ow is realized and agents get paid.
2.1 Investment
The ¯rm in this economy has access to a production technology, which at time t = 2
generates cash °ow ~ FI. Here, I is the amount of investment ¯nanced by the capital provider,
and ~ F ¸ 0 is the level of productivity. Let ~ f denote the natural log of productivity, ~ f = ln ~ F.
We assume that ~ f is unobservable and drawn from a normal distribution with mean ¹ f and
variance ¾2
f. We use ¿f to denote 1=¾2
f. Focusing on the natural log of the productivity
parameter is important for the tractability of our model and is part of the methodological
contribution of our paper.
At time t = 1 the capital provider chooses the level of capital I. Providing capital is
costly and the capital provider must incur a private cost of: C(I) = 1
2cI2, where c > 0. This
cost can be thought of as the cost of raising the capital, which is increasing in the amount of
capital provided, or as e®ort incurred in monitoring the investment (which is also increasing
in the size of the investment). The capital provider's bene¯t increases in the cash °ow
5generated by the investment. For simplicity, we assume that he captures the full cash °ow,
i.e., he gets ~ FI, but none of the results depends on this assumption. The capital provider
chooses I to maximize the value of the cash °ow from investing in the ¯rm's production
technology minus his cost of raising capital C(I), conditional on his information set, Fl; at
t = 1:
I = argmax
I
E[ ~ FI ¡ C(I)jFl]. (1)
The solution to this maximization problem is:
I =
E[ ~ FjFl]
c
. (2)
The capital provider's information set, denoted by Fl, consists of a private signal ~ sl
received at date 0 and the asset price observed at the date 0, P (we will elaborate on this
next). That is, Fl = f~ sl;Pg. The private signal ~ sl is a noisy signal about ~ f with precision
¿l: ~ sl = ~ f + ¾l~ ²l, where ~ ²l is distributed normally with mean zero and standard deviation
one and ¿l = 1=¾2
l .
2.2 Speculative Trading
The traded asset is a derivative, whose payo® replicates the payo® of the ¯rm's invest-
ment. That is, the payo® is ~ FI, which is realized at the ¯nal date t = 2. The price of this
risky asset at t = 0 is denoted by P.
There is a measure-one continuum of heterogeneously informed risk-neutral speculators
indexed by i 2 [0;1]. Each speculator is endowed with two signals about ~ f at time 0. The
¯rst signal, ~ si = ~ f+¾s~ ²i, is privately observed where ~ ²i is independently normally distributed
across speculators with mean zero and unit variance. The precision of this signal is denoted
as ¿s = 1=¾2
s. The second signal is ~ sc = ~ f + ¾c~ ²c. This signal is observed by all speculators
and ~ ²c is independently and normally distributed with mean zero and unit variance and
¿c = 1=¾2
c.7
7Our results remain the same but with expositional complexity in an alternative setup where the second
signal is speci¯ed as a heterogenous private signal with a common noise component ~ ²c and an agent-speci¯c
noise component ~ ²2i. That is, ~ sci = ~ f +¾c~ ²c+¾²2~ ²2i, where ~ ²c and ~ ²2i are independently normally distributed
variables with mean zero and variance one. In this setup, the second signal can be observed by the capital
provider as well. Essentially, for our results to go through, speculators need to share some correlated
information to facilitate coordination and this information cannot be entirely ¯ltered out by the capital
provider.
6Each speculator can buy or sell up to a unit of the risky asset. The size of speculator i's
position is denoted by x(i) 2 [¡1;1]. This position limit can be justi¯ed by limited capital
and/or borrowing constraints faced by speculators.8 Due to risk neutrality, speculators
choose their positions to maximize expected pro¯ts. For example, a speculator's pro¯t from
shorting one unit of the asset is given by P ¡ ~ FI, where ~ FI is the asset payo® and P is the
price of the asset.
Formally, speculator i chooses x(i) to solve:
max
x(i)2[¡1;1]
x(i)E
h
~ FI ¡ PjFi
i
; (3)
where Fi denotes the information set of speculator i and consists of ~ si and ~ sc. Since each
speculator has measure zero and is risk neutral, an informed speculator optimally chooses to
either short up to the position limit, or buy up to the position limit. We denote the aggregate
demand by speculators as X =
R 1
0 x(i)di, which is given by the fraction of speculators who
buy the asset minus the fraction of those who short the asset.
2.3 Equilibrium
At date 0, conditional on his information, each speculator submits a market order to
buy or sell a unit of the asset to a Walrasian auctioneer. The Walrasian auctioneer then
obtains the aggregate demand by speculators X and also a noisy supply curve from unin-
formed traders, and sets a price to clear the market. The noisy supply of the risky asset is
exogenously given by Q(~ »;P), a continuous function of the exogenous demand shock ~ » and
price P. The supply curve Q(~ »;P) is strictly decreasing in ~ », and increasing in P, that is,
it is upward slopping in price. The demand shock ~ » 2 R is independent of other shocks in
the economy, and ~ » » N(0;¾2
»). The shock ~ » can be interpreted as demand for the asset
by liquidity traders, and so a high ¾2
» characterizes a liquid market. As always, we denote
¿» = 1=¾2
».
To solve the model in closed form, we assume that Q(~ »;P) takes the following functional
form:
Q(~ »;P) = 1 ¡ 2©
Ã
~ » ¡ ln(±P)
¾s
!
; (4)
8The speci¯c size of this position limit on asset holdings is not crucial for our results. What is crucial is
that informed speculators cannot take unlimited positions; if they do, strategic interaction among informed
speculators will become immaterial.
7where ©(¢) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function. We now turn to
the de¯nition of equilibrium.
Definition 1: [Equilibrium with Market Orders ] An equilibrium consists of a price func-
tion, P( ~ f;~ ²c; ~ ») : R3 ! R, an investment policy for the capital provider I(~ sl;P) : R2 ! R,
strategies for speculators, x(~ si; ~ sc) : R2 ! [¡1;1], and the corresponding aggregate demand
X( ~ f;~ ²c), such that:
² For speculator i, x(~ si; ~ sc) 2 argmaxx(i)2[¡1;1] x(i)E
h
~ FI ¡ Pj~ si; ~ sc
i
;
² The capital provider's investment is I(~ sl;P) = E
h
~ Fj~ sl;P
i
=c.
² The market clearing condition for the risky asset is satis¯ed:
Q(~ »;P) = X( ~ f;~ ²c) =
Z
x( ~ f + ¾s~ ²i; ~ f + ¾c~ ²c)d©(~ ²i): (5)
A linear monotone equilibrium is an equilibrium where x(~ si; ~ sc) = 1 if ~ si + k~ sc ¸ g for
constants k and g, and x(~ si; ~ sc) = ¡1 otherwise. In words: in a monotone linear equilibrium,
a speculator buys the asset if and only if a linear combination of her signals is above a cuto®
g, and sells it otherwise. In the rest of the paper we focus on linear monotone equilibria.
3 Solving the Model
In this section, we explain the main steps that are required to solve our model. Restricting
attention to a linear monotone equilibrium, we ¯rst use the market clearing condition to
determine the asset price. We then characterize the information content of the asset price to
derive the capital provider's belief on ~ f based on fP; ~ slg and solve for the optimal investment
problem. Finally, given the capital provider's investment rule and the asset pricing rule, we
solve for individual speculators' optimal trading decision.
In a linear monotone equilibrium, speculators short the asset whenever ~ si + k~ sc · g or,
equivalently, ¾s~ ²i · g¡(1 + k) ~ f ¡k¾c~ ²c. Hence, their aggregate selling can be characterized
by: ©
³³
g ¡ (1 + k) ~ f ¡ k¾c~ ²c
´
=¾s
´
. Conversely, they purchase the asset whenever ~ si +
k~ sc ¸ g or, equivalently, ¾s~ ²i ¸ g ¡ (1 + k) ~ f ¡ k¾c~ ²c. Hence, their aggregate purchase can
be characterized by 1 ¡ ©
³³
g ¡ (1 + k) ~ f ¡ k¾c~ ²c
´
=¾s
´
. The net holding from speculators
is then:
X
³
~ f;~ ²c
´
= 1 ¡ 2©
Ã
g ¡ (1 + k) ~ f ¡ k¾c~ ²c
¾s
!
: (6)
8The market clearing condition together with Equation (4) indicate that
1 ¡ 2©
Ã
g ¡ (1 + k) ~ f ¡ k¾c~ ²c
¾s
!
= 1 ¡ 2©
Ã
~ » ¡ ln(±P)
¾s
!
: (7)
Therefore the equilibrium price is given by
±P = exp
³
(1 + k) ~ f + k¾c~ ²c ¡ g + ~ »
´
= exp
³
~ f + k~ sc ¡ g + ~ »
´
; (8)
which can be rewritten as
z(P) ´
g + ln(±P)
1 + k
= ~ f +
k
1 + k
¾c~ ²c +
1
1 + k
~ » =
µ
1
1 + k
¶
~ f +
k
1 + k
~ sc +
1
1 + k
~ »: (9)
From the above equation, we can see that z(P), which is a su±cient statistic for the
information in P, provides some information about the realization of the productivity shock
~ f. Yet, the signal z(P) is not fully revealing of ~ f, as it is also a®ected by the noise in the
common signal ~ ²c and by the noisy demand ~ ». Since the capital provider observes z(P),
he will use it to update his belief about the productivity. Note that z (P) is distributed
normally with a mean of ¹ f and a variance of ¾2
p = (k=(1 + k))
2 ¾2
c + (1=(1 + k))
2 ¾2
». We
denote the precision of z(P) as a signal for ~ f as:
¿p =
1
¾2
p
=
(1 + k)
2 ¿c¿»
k2¿» + ¿c
: (10)
After characterizing the information content of the price, we can derive the capital
provider's belief on ~ f. That is, conditional on observing ~ sl and z (P), the capital provider
believes that ~ f is distributed normally with mean
¿f
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
¹ f +
¿l
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
sl +
¿p
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
z (P) (11)
and variance 1=(¿f + ¿l + ¿p). Then, using the capital provider's investment rule in Equation
(1) and taking expectations, we can express the level of investment as:
I =
1
c
E[ ~ Fj~ sl = sl;P] =
1
c
E[exp
³
~ f
´
j~ sl = sl;P] (12)
=
1
c
exp
µ
¿f ¹ f + ¿lsl + ¿pz (P)
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
+
1
2(¿f + ¿l + ¿p)
¶
:
Given the capital provider's investment policy in (12) and the price in (8), we can now
write speculator i's expected pro¯t from buying the asset given the information that is
available to him (shorting the asset would give the negative of this):
E
h
~ FI ¡ Pj~ si; ~ sc
i
(13)
=
1
c
E
·
exp
µ
¿f ¹ f + ¿lsl + ¿pz (P)
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
+
1
2(¿f + ¿l + ¿p)
+ ~ f
¶
j~ si; ~ sc
¸
¡E
·
1
±
exp
³
~ f + k~ sc ¡ g + ~ »
´
j~ si; ~ sc
¸
:
9Note that we made use here of the fact that ~ F = exp
³
~ f
´
. This is where focusing on the
natural log of the productivity parameter plays a key role. Using the properties of the exp
function, we can express the value of the ¯rm ~ FI as exp
³
¿f ¹ f+¿lsl+¿pz(P)
¿f+¿l+¿p + 1
2(¿f+¿l+¿p) + ~ f
´
,
where the expression in parentheses is linear in ~ f. This enables us to get a linear closed-form
solution, which would otherwise be impossible in a model of feedback.
Conditional on observing ~ si and ~ sc, speculator i believes that ~ f is distributed normally
with mean
¿f
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
¹ f +
¿s
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
~ si +
¿c
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
~ sc (14)
and variance 1=(¿f + ¿s + ¿c). Hence, substituting for z (P) (from (9)) and taking expecta-
tions, Equation (13) can be rewritten as:
E
h
~ FI ¡ Pj~ si; ~ sc
i
=
1
c
exp
0
B
B
B
B
B
@
¿f ¹ f+¿p
k
1+k ~ sc+ 1
2
¿f+¿l+¿p + (¿f+2¿l+¿p(1+ 1
1+k))
¿f+¿l+¿p
³
¿f ¹ f+¿s~ si+¿c~ sc
¿f+¿s+¿c
´
+
µ
¿f+2¿l+(1+ 1
1+k)¿p
¿f+¿l+¿p
¶2
1
2(¿f+¿s+¿c) + 1
2
³
¿l
¿f+¿l+¿p
´2
¾2
l
+1
2
³
¿p
¿f+¿l+¿p
´2 ¡
1
1+k
¢2 ¾2
»
1
C
C
C
C
C
A
¡
1
±
exp
µ
¿f ¹ f + ¿s~ si + ¿c~ sc + 1
2
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
+ k~ sc ¡ g +
1
2
¾
2
»
¶
: (15)
In equilibrium, a speculator who receives a private signal ~ si = g¡k~ sc must be indi®erent
between buying the asset or shorting it. That is,
E
h
P ¡ ~ FIj~ si = g ¡ k~ sc; ~ sc
i
= 0: (16)
Substituting ~ si = g¡k~ sc into (15), and taking logs, the indi®erence condition of (16) becomes:
ln
1
c
+
Ã
¿f ¹ f + ¿p
k
1+k~ sc + 1
2
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
+
¡
¿f + 2¿l +
¡
1 + 1
1+k
¢
¿p
¢
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
µ
¿f ¹ f + ¿s (g ¡ k~ sc) + ¿c~ sc
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
¶!
+
Ã
¿f + 2¿l +
¡
1 + 1
1+k
¢
¿p
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
!2
1
2(¿f + ¿s + ¿c)
+
1
2
µ
¿l
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
¶2
¾
2
l
+
1
2
µ
¿p
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
¶2 µ
1
1 + k
¶2
¾
2
»
= ln
1
±
+
¿f ¹ f + ¿s (g ¡ k~ sc) + ¿c~ sc + 1
2
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
+ k~ sc ¡ g +
1
2
¾
2
»: (17)
In a linear monotone equilibrium, this indi®erence condition must hold for all ~ sc. Hence,
the coe±cient for ~ sc in the above expression must be zero. Using this, we solve for the
speculator's cuto® strategy and characterize the equilibrium. The result is provided in the
10following proposition. The proof of this proposition, as well as all other proofs, is in the
Appendix.
Proposition 1: There is a unique linear monotone equilibrium. In the equilibrium, the
(strictly positive) weight k¤ on the common signal is the unique real root of:
0 = ¡(¿s¿l + (¿f + ¿s + ¿c)(¿f + ¿l + ¿c))k
3 + ¿c (¿l ¡ 2¿s ¡ ¿f ¡ ¿c)k
2 (18)
+¿c (¿c ¡ ¿s)k + ¿
2
c ¡
¿c
¿»
(¿s¿l + (¿f + ¿l)(¿f + ¿s + ¿c))k +
¿2
c ¿l
¿»
:
The weight speculators put on the common signal in equilibrium, k¤, captures the degree
of coordination in their trading decisions. When k¤ is high, speculators put a large weight
on the common information when deciding whether to sell or buy the asset. This leads to
large coordination among them and gives rise to a trading frenzy. In the upcoming sections,
we develop a series of results on the determinants of coordination and its implications for
the e±ciency of the investment decision and for the volatility of prices.
4 The Determinants of Speculators' Coordination
The weight that speculators put on the common signal in this model is a®ected by the
degree to which there are strategic complementarities or strategic substitutes among them.
Strategic substitutes are generated by the usual price mechanism. Since the aggregation of
speculators' orders a®ects the price, when many of them decide to short sell (buy) the asset,
the price is low (high), and the pro¯t from short selling (buying) is low. This creates an
incentive for speculators to act di®erently from others { their incentive to short sell (or buy)
the asset decreases if many others are expected to do so { and thus leads speculators to put
less weight on the common signal in their trading decision. Strategic complementarities, on
the other hand, are generated here by the feedback e®ect that prices have on the investment
decision and thus on the real value of the ¯rm. When many speculators decide to short sell
(buy) the asset, the price declines (rises), and this transmits a negative (positive) signal to
the capital provider that leads to a reduction (an increase) in the level of investment. Then,
the value of the ¯rm decreases (increases) and this increases the pro¯t from short selling
(buying). This creates an incentive for speculators to coordinate and act like each other,
and thus to put more weight on the common signal. The resulting level of k¤ re°ects the
sum of these two e®ects in addition to the raw e®ect that the precision of the signals (private
and common) has on the weights they should receive. In the rest of this section, we isolate
11the various determinants of coordination to understand the impact of each factor on the
equilibrium level of coordination.
4.1 Impact of Learning by the Capital Provider
To get a clearer understanding of the two e®ects, let us start by shutting down one
of them. In particular, suppose that there is no feedback e®ect from prices to real values,
because the capital provider does not learn from the price. In this case, the capital provider's
decision on how much capital to provide becomes (this equation is analogous to Equation
(12) in the full model):
I =
1
c
E[ ~ Fj~ sl = sl] (19)
=
1
c
exp
µ
¿f
¿f + ¿l
¹ f +
¿l
¿f + ¿l
sl +
1
2(¿f + ¿l)
¶
:
We again solve for the linear monotone equilibrium where speculators short sell the asset if
and only if ~ si +kBM~ sc · gBM (the subscript BM stands for `benchmark'), and purchase the
asset otherwise. Given the investment rule in (19), the expected pro¯t for speculator i from
buying the asset, given the information available to her, becomes (this equation is analogous
to Equation (13) in the full model):
E[ ~ FI ¡ Pj~ si; ~ sc] (20)
= E
·
1
c
exp
µ
¿f ¹ f + ¿lsl
¿f + ¿l
+
1
2(¿f + ¿l)
¶
~ Fj~ si; ~ sc
¸
¡ E
·
1
±
exp
³
~ f + kBM~ sc ¡ gBM + ~ »
´
j~ si; ~ sc
¸
:
We know that a speculator observing ~ si = gBM ¡ kBM~ sc is indi®erent between buying and
shorting the asset. Following similar steps to those in the full model, we obtain:
ln
µ
1
c
¶
+
¿f ¹ f + 1
2
¿f + ¿l
+
µ
¿f + 2¿l
¿f + ¿l
¶µ
¿f ¹ f + ¿s (gBM ¡ kBM~ sc) + ¿c~ sc
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
¶
(21)
+
µ
¿f + 2¿l
¿f + ¿l
¶2 1
2(¿f + ¿s + ¿c)
+
1
2
µ
¿l
¿f + ¿l
¶2
¾
2
l
= ln
1
±
+
¿f ¹ f + ¿s (gBM ¡ kBM~ sc) + ¿c~ sc + 1
2
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
+ kBM~ sc ¡ gBM +
1
2
¾
2
»:
Finally, since the above equality must be satis¯ed for all ~ sc we set the coe±cient of ~ sc to
zero:
µ
¿f + 2¿l
¿f + ¿l
¶µ
1
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
¶
(¡kBM¿s + ¿c) =
µ
1
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
¶
(¡kBM¿s + ¿c)+kBM: (22)
12Then, we obtain the weight that speculators put on the common signal in the case of no
feedback e®ect from price to real investment:
kBM =
¿l¿c
(¿f + ¿s + ¿c)(¿f + ¿l) + ¿l¿s
: (23)
The following proposition states the properties of kBM in comparison with the equilibrium
weight k¤ in the full model.
Proposition 2: If the capital provider does not learn from the price when making lending
decisions, the weight speculators put on the common signal kBM is strictly below the equi-
librium weight k¤ they put in the full model (with a feedback e®ect), which is lower, in turn,
from ¿c=¿s { the precision ratio of the two signals held by the speculators.
We can see that when we shut down the feedback e®ect from the price to real investment,
the weight that speculators put on the common signal decreases. This is in line with our
discussion above, according to which the feedback e®ect from prices to real investment is the
source of complementarity in speculators' strategies, making them want to put more weight
on the common signal. Hence, the feedback e®ect is the cause of trading frenzies in our
model.
Moreover, as one would expect, without a feedback e®ect the substitutability among
speculators' strategies reduces the weight that speculators put on the common signal below
the ratio between the precision of the two signals held by the speculators, ¿c=¿s, which
is the weight that speculators would be expected to put on the common signal absent any
strategic e®ects. Interestingly, even with the feedback e®ect, k¤ is less than ¿c=¿s highlighting
the strength of the substitution e®ect from the price. Note, however, that ¿c=¿s is not the
optimal level of coordination. As we will see later, k¤ is sometimes above and sometimes
below the optimal level of coordination
4.2 Impact of Noise Trading
The comparison with the case of no feedback clari¯es that the feedback e®ect from the
price to the real investment has a crucial impact. It creates an incentive for speculators to
coordinate to in°uence the decision of the capital provider. Clearly, in a model with feedback,
the ability of speculators to transmit a message to the capital provider via the price depends
on the amount of noise trading. As the following proposition states, this a®ects the weight
speculators end up putting on the common signal.
13Proposition 3: The equilibrium weight k¤ that speculators put on the common signal in
the presence of feedback e®ects (i.e., the full model) is decreasing in the variance of noise
demand ¾2
».
The intuition here goes as follows: With high variance in the noise demand, there is high
variance in the market price for reasons that are not related to speculators' trades. As a
result, the ability of speculators to impact the capital provider's decision via coordination
diminishes. This reduces the incentive of speculators to act like each other and thus reduces
the equilibrium level of k¤. Interpreting this result, we obtain the interesting implication
that informed speculators are more likely to act in a coordinated fashion in illiquid markets,
and so illiquid markets are those were trading frenzies can arise.
Finally, it is worth noting that changes in the position limits of speculators will have
similar e®ects to changes in the variance of noise trading. For example, if speculators could
choose positions in the range [¡2;2] (instead of [¡1;1], assumed in the paper), they would
have more impact on the capital provider's decision for a given level of ¾2
» and thus would
coordinate their trades more in equilibrium. Hence, the e®ect of loosening speculators'
trading constraints is similar to that of reducing the variance of noise trading (i.e., of reducing
liquidity).
4.3 Impact of the Information Structure
We now establish comparative statics results on the e®ect of the informativeness of various
signals on the equilibrium level of coordination. The results are summarized in the next
proposition.
Proposition 4: The equilibrium level of coordination decreases in the precision of the
prior and the private signals: @k¤=@¿f < 0 and @k¤=@¿s < 0: If the prior is not too precise
(for small enough ¿f), the equilibrium level of coordination decreases in the precision of the
capital provider's signal and increases in the precision of the common signal: @k¤=@¿l < 0
and @k¤=@¿c > 0.
The proposition shows that a more precise prior reduces the ability of speculators to
coordinate. Since the capital provider relies more on the prior when it becomes more pre-
cise, the scope for speculators to a®ect the capital provider's belief is much more limited.
Therefore, speculators have a lower incentive to act like other speculators, and they reduce
the weight put on the common signal. The precision of speculators' idiosyncratic signals
also has a negative e®ect on the degree of coordination in equilibrium. If each speculator
14holds a very precise private signal about the fundamental, each bases the trading decision
mostly on the private signal rather than on the noisy common signal, and hence there is less
coordination.
For volatile enough underlying fundamentals, the proposition shows that if the capital
provider's private information is less precise, or the common signal is more precise, spec-
ulators coordinate more in equilibrium. Intuitively, if the capital provider holds a precise
signal, he relies less on the information revealed in the market price. In equilibrium, this gives
speculators little incentive to coordinate since their ability to a®ect the capital provider's
beliefs is limited. Hence, the equilibrium weight on the common signal is lower. Finally,
the incentive to coordinate is largest when the common signal is very precise. In this case,
speculators put a large weight on the common signal and the capital provider does not ignore
the information revealed in the market price.
We also note that simulations indicate that the result that @k¤=@¿c > 0 holds no matter
what the value of ¿f is. Simulations show, however, that the restriction of small ¿f is
necessary for the result that @k¤=@¿l < 0. For large ¿f, an increase in ¿l leads to a larger k¤,
that is, a higher degree of coordination among speculators. Overall, when the prior is very
precise (higher ¿f), there is little room for speculators to coordinate their trading in order
to a®ect the capital provider's beliefs. However, in this case, if the capital provider's private
signal becomes more precise, he will gradually rely less on the prior, allowing more room for
speculators to coordinate and a®ect the capital provider's actions.
5 Coordination, E±ciency, and Volatility
In this section, we explore the e®ect that coordination has on the e±ciency of investment
decisions and on market volatility. As our e±ciency criterion, we use the ex ante expected
net bene¯t of investment (i.e. expected net bene¯t before any of the signals are realized
given the prior belief that ~ f is normally distributed with mean ¹ f and precision ¿f) from the
perspective of the capital provider. This e±ciency criterion is appropriate in the context of
our model since the derivative market can be regarded as a zero-sum game. We keep the
information structure the same as before, and in particular, in the interim stage we allow
the capital provider to obtain information only from his private signal and the price. So our
e±ciency criterion is given by:
E0
·
max
I
E
·
~ FI ¡
1
2
cI
2 j~ sl = sl;P
¸¸
; (24)
15where a speculator purchases the asset if ~ si+k~ sc ¸ g and shorts it otherwise (for constant k
and g) and P is the market clearing price. We denote the optimal level of coordination kOP
to be the one that maximizes (24).
The following proposition characterizes the optimal level of coordination, kOP, and how
it is linked to the accuracy of the information inferred from the market price, ¿p:
Proposition 5: The optimal level of coordination that maximizes (24) is kOP = ¿c=¿»,
which also maximizes ¿p. Ex ante e±ciency increases in k for k < kOP and decreases for
k > kOP.
Essentially, the capital provider cares about the events in the security market only to
the extent that it a®ects the quality of the information he has when making the investment
decision. Hence, the level of coordination that is optimal is the one that maximizes the
accuracy of the information in the market price. Examining the expression for ¿p in (10),
we can see that there is a tradeo® in setting the level of coordination. The tradeo® arises
because there are two sources of noise in the price, one coming from the noise demand and
the other one from the noise in the common signal. A high level of coordination reduces
the e®ect of the ¯rst source of noise { as speculative trading becomes more prominent than
noise trading { and increases the e®ect of the second source of noise { as the weight on the
common signal is higher. Therefore, the optimal level of coordination will be high when
the potential damage from noise demand is high (¿» is low) or when the potential damage
from noise in the common signal is low (¿c is high). One can easily verify from (10) that, on
balance, optimal coordination is given by kOP = ¿c=¿».
It is interesting to compare the optimal level of coordination characterized here with
the level of coordination that is obtained in equilibrium. From Proposition 3 we know that
in equilibrium speculators coordinate more when the variance in the noise demand is low
(¿» is high). A high ¿» implies that speculators' trades have more e®ect on the capital
provider's decision, giving them more incentive to coordinate. Yet, this is exactly when
coordination is not desirable for the e±ciency of the investment. Hence, there is a sharp
contrast between the pro¯t incentives of speculators and the e±ciency of the investment.
Speculators coordinate more exactly when it is ine±cient to do so. The following proposition
summarizes the comparison between the optimal level of coordination and the equilibrium
level of coordination.
Proposition 6: There exists ¹ ¿» such that kOP > k¤ for ¿» < ¹ ¿» and kOP < k¤ for ¿» > ¹ ¿».
The proposition says that speculators coordinate too much in illiquid markets and coor-
16dinate too little in liquid markets. Interestingly, this implies that trading frenzies are only
sometimes undesirable. When there is high variation in noise demand, price informativeness
would improve if speculators coordinated their trades more to provide a signal that over-
comes the e®ect of noise demand. Yet, it is exactly in this case that they ¯nd coordination
less pro¯table.
We close this section by noting some of the implications of ine±cient coordination levels.
Deviations from the optimal level of coordination kOP are manifested in our model by higher
levels of excess volatility. The following proposition establishes the link between the level
of coordination and excess volatility { volatility that does not come from the variability in
fundamental { of price and investment.
Proposition 7: (a) Excess volatility of asset price is minimized at k = kOP (where its
value is 1=(¿c + ¿»)), decreases in k when k < kOP and increases in k when k > kOP. In
particular, when k > kOP, excess volatility of asset prices is higher because prices are more
sensitive to the noise component in speculators' common signal ~ ²c. When k < kOP, excess
volatility of asset prices is higher because prices are more sensitive to the noise demand ~ ».
(b) Similarly, excess volatility of investment is minimized at k = kOP (where its value is
1=(¿l + ¿c + ¿»)), decreases in k when k < kOP and increases in k when k > kOP.
This proposition indicates that the strategic interactions among speculators in the ¯nan-
cial markets often lead to the excess (non-fundamental) volatility in prices as well as real
activities. The source of this excess volatility could come from either too low coordination
(that is, when the market is characterized by a high amount of trading by noise investors)
or too high coordination (that is, when the market is illiquid and the noise in the correlated
signals among speculators is high).
6 Policy Implications
As demonstrated earlier, the equilibrium level of coordination is either too high or too
low, both of which lead to excess volatility in the asset market and the real economy and to
loss of e±ciency. To curb extreme and disruptive swings in these markets, the government
may consider stepping in under certain conditions. Next, we describe two broad types of
policy interventions: those that directly regulate the funding of the ¯rms and those that
oversee the trading of the security markets.
176.1 Funding Policies Contingent on Economic Conditions
One of the main policy tools available to the government is the control over the capital
provider's cost of capital. The government can a®ect the cost of capital by changing the
interest rate and/or the availability of funds. In our model, the focus is on the e®ect that
such policies may have on the behavior of speculators in the security market.
Changes in the cost of capital that are not contingent on the realization of variables
in the model will change the level of investment and the pro¯ts of speculators, but not
their incentive to coordinate (i.e., the weights they put on correlated vs. idiosyncratic
information). This is because the unconditional change in the cost of capital does not
a®ect the ability of speculators to in°uence the decision of the capital provider. It a®ects
the overall level of investment but not its dependence on messages from the ¯nancial market.
However, if the cost of capital is made contingent on the realization of the fundamental, the
capital provider will change the sensitivity of his investment policy to market signals, and
this will make coordination more or less attractive for speculators. Therefore, for policies
that a®ect the cost of capital to be e®ective in our context the government needs to condition
the capital provider's cost of investment on some fundamental-related information that will
be revealed ex post.
To illustrate this point we assume that the government can a®ect the cost of investment
based on the ex post realization of the fundamental itself. This policy can be implemented,
for example, as an ex post tax (or subsidy) to investment. The level of ~ F could be tied
to the GDP or a general industry performance index which is less subject to manipulation
by individual investors. More speci¯cally, we assume that the government sets the capital
provider's cost so that the net cost of investment is C(I; ~ F) = 1
2c ~ F ¯I2 when the realized
fundamental is ~ F. In this case, a funding policy with a positive ¯ leads to a higher cost of
investment when productivity is high (large ~ F.) Similarly, a funding policy with a negative
¯ reduces the cost of investment for larger ~ F.
We now analyze the new game with such state-contingent government policies in place.
That is, the government chooses ¯ to a®ect the capital provider's cost. After the policy
choice, the capital provider and speculators play the same game as before. The equilibrium
of the game with policy intervention is also de¯ned just like before, except that the capital
provider now maximizes E[ ~ FI ¡ C(I; ~ F)jFl] = E[ ~ FI ¡ 1
2c ~ F ¯I2jFl]. Once again we look
for linear monotone equilibria where x(~ si; ~ sc) = 1 if ~ si + k~ sc ¸ g for constant k and g,
and x(~ si; ~ sc) = ¡1 otherwise. Equilibrium price is still given by Equation (8). Following
steps that are similar to the ones that we used in solving the standard model we solve for
18the speculators' cuto® strategy and characterize the equilibrium of the game with policy
intervention.
Proposition 8: There is a unique linear monotone equilibrium of the game with policy
intervention for ¯ close to zero. In the equilibrium, the (strictly positive) weight k(¯) on the
common signal is the unique real root of:
¿p
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
k(¯)
1 + k(¯)
+
¿f + (2 ¡ ¯)¿l +
³³
1¡¯
1+k(¯) + 1
´´
¿p
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
µ
¡¿sk(¯) + ¿c
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
¶
¡
¡¿sk(¯) + ¿c
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
¡k(¯) = 0:
Utilizing the equilibrium condition in Proposition 8, we can characterize the comparative
statistics of k(¯) with respect to ¯, a policy instrument controlled by the central planner.
The following proposition presents the result.
Proposition 9: For ¯ close to zero, a policy with the cost of funding positively correlated
with the fundamental (¯ > 0) leads to less coordination among speculators and a policy
with the cost of funding negatively correlated with the fundamental (¯ < 0) leads to more
coordination among speculators.
To understand this result intuitively, consider the case where the policy imposes a higher
cost of funding when the fundamental is stronger (¯ > 0). In this case, investment is
relatively more costly in a state of high productivity than in a state of low productivity, and
the capital provider's investment decision is less sensitive to his belief about the productivity
level. Consequently, the speculators' incentive to coordinate is smaller since learning through
the price will have less of an impact in shaping the capital provider's investment decision.
In the opposite case, when the policy imposes a lower cost of funding when the fundamental
is stronger (¯ < 0), the capital provider's investment decision is more sensitive to his belief
about the state of the fundamentals, and this increases the incentive for speculators to
coordinate.
Recall from Proposition 6 that there exists ¹ ¿» such that k¤ is smaller than kOP for ¿» less
than ¹ ¿» and the reverse is true for ¿» larger than ¹ ¿». In the former case, there is too little
coordination and in the latter case there is too much coordination. In either case moving
coordination closer to the optimal level increases informational e±ciency and lowers excess
volatility. Combining this with Proposition 9 we obtain the next corollary:
Corollary 1: There exists ¹ ¿» such that a policy that has positive correlation between
the cost of funding and the productivity level (¯ > 0 for ¯ small) when ¿» is larger than ¹ ¿»,
19and negative correlation (¯ < 0 for ¯ small) when ¿» is less than ¹ ¿» improves e±ciency and
reduces excess volatility.
The above corollary implies that when ~ » has low variance (which can be interpreted as
low market liquidity), the government should adopt policies where the cost of funding is
positively correlated with the realized productivity shock. To understand this, recall that
when market liquidity is low, speculators coordinate too much, because it is easier for them
to impact the capital provider's beliefs through their impact on the price. By adopting such
a state-contingent policy, the government diminishes the sensitivity of the capital provider's
investment decision to the market signal. This makes coordination less desirable. Conversely,
when market liquidity is high, the government should adopt policies where the cost of funding
is negatively correlated with productivity since such a policy increases the sensitivity of the
capital provider's investment decision to the market signal and makes coordination more
desirable. Adopting such state-contingent funding policies would increase the information
e±ciency of asset prices, and decrease the excess volatility in the ¯nancial market and in the
real economy.
6.2 Intervention in Security Trading
Another type of intervention is to increase the informational e±ciency of market prices by
changing the trading and information environment. One of the key determinants of strategic
trading in the security market is the level of noise trading. To increase e±ciency and curb
excess volatility, the government may directly control noise trading. The following corollary
states this policy implication which follows from Proposition 6.
Corollary 2: The equilibrium k¤ is closer to kOP if the government increases ¿» when
¿» < ¹ ¿» and decreases ¿» when ¿» > ¹ ¿».
That is, when the market is very liquid (~ » has high variance), intervention should focus
on absorbing this liquidity. Conversely, when the market is illiquid (~ » has low variance), the
government should step in and provide market liquidity. This market liquidity intervention
can be in the form of buying and selling market indices. This policy encourages coordination
among speculators when there is too little coordination and discourages coordination when
there is too much coordination. By doing so it increases the informational e±ciency of prices.
Interestingly, in our model, liquidity is not always a good thing, and sometimes it is optimal
to limit it. Speci¯cally, this happens when too much noise trading reduces the ability of the
capital provider to learn from the price and speculators fail to coordinate their trading to
20overcome this e®ect. It should be noted that our conclusions are derived in a model where
the information structure is given exogenously. It would be interesting to endogenize the
precision of various signals and see how this is a®ected by the changes in the liquidity of the
market.
Intervention can also target directly the information available to the speculators or to
the capital provider as described by the following corollary (which follows immediately from
Proposition 4):
Corollary 3: When there is too much (little) coordination, the government can move the
equilibrium level of coordination towards kOP by increasing (decreasing) ¿l and/or ¿s, or by
decreasing (increasing) ¿c.
There are various ways by which the government can achieve these changes in the infor-
mation environment. An increase in ¿l can be achieved by making more information about
the ¯rm's productivity available to capital providers (but not making it available to spec-
ulators at the same time). A decrease in ¿c can be achieved by restricting communication
among speculators and thus reducing the correlation among their information sets. In an
environment where the quality of the information held by speculators is heterogenous, the
government may prevent a coordinated `run' on a ¯rm by imposing a transaction cost on
trading which makes market participation less attractive to those holding less precise signals
and thus improves the precision of private signals available to market participants (¿s).
Finally, we consider the e®ect of making public announcements.
Corollary 4: By releasing public news, ~ sn = ~ f + ~ ²n¾n, where ¿n = 1=¾2
n, to all market
participants, the government can reduce the equilibrium level of coordination.
This result follows immediately from Proposition 4 since by releasing a public signal to
all market participants, the precision of the prior increases to (¿f + ¿n). This implication
about the e®ect of transparency contrasts the recent literature emphasizing that more public
information might have a perverse e®ect on the information e±ciency of the market.9 In
this literature, this might be due to the fact that more precise public information increases
the ability of speculators to coordinate or lowers the incentive for speculators to act on
their private information, causing the aggregate variables such as price or trading volume to
be less informative. In our setting, transparency policy unambiguously lowers speculators'
9There is a large literature on transparency. Some recent works include Morris and Shin (2002, 2005),
Heinemann and Cornand (2004), Woodford (2005), Svensson (2005), Hellwig (2005), Angeletos and Pavan
(2007), and Amador and Weill (2007).
21ability to coordinate and increases their incentive to act on their private information. This is
because the public news becomes available to the credit provider, and makes him rely less on
information from the market. This, in turn, makes speculators less interested in coordinating
their trading (around common information that is available to them but not to the capital
provider) and induces them to rely more on their private signals.
7 Conclusion
We study strategic interactions among speculators in ¯nancial markets and their real
e®ects. Two opposite strategic e®ects exist. On the one hand, speculators wish to act
di®erently from each other as a certain action by other speculators changes the price in a
way that reduces the pro¯t for other speculators from this action. On the other hand, due
to the feedback e®ect from the price to the real investment, a certain action by speculators
changes the real value of the ¯rm in a way that increases the incentive of other speculators
to take this action. This creates a basis for trading frenzies, where speculators rush to trade
in the same direction, putting pressure on the price and on the ¯rm's value. We characterize
which e®ect dominates when and analyze the resulting level of coordination in speculators'
actions.
The interaction among speculators a®ects the informational content of the price. Since
prices a®ect real investment in our model, we can ask what level of coordination is most
e±cient for real investment. In general, speculators' incentives to coordinate go in opposite
direction to the optimal level of coordination. Speculators want to coordinate more when
there is low amount of noise trading, but this is when coordination is less desirable from an
e±ciency point of view. Hence, our model shows that there is always either too much or too
little coordination, and this reduces the e±ciency of investment and creates excess volatility
in the price.
By analyzing the feedback mechanism between ¯nancial market trading and real invest-
ment activities, our model has implications for policy measures that can alter the level of
coordination and improve e±ciency. We consider changes to the cost of capital for the ¯rm
contingent on productivity fundamentals, and also measures that directly a®ect the trad-
ing environment by changing liquidity, transparency, and the precision of various sources of
information.
Interestingly, our paper is also related to an old debate on whether speculators stabilize
prices. The traditional view is that by buying low and selling dear, rational speculators
stabilize prices. Hart and Kreps (1986) argue that when speculators can hold inventories and
22there is uncertainty about preferences, speculative activity may cause excess price movement.
Our paper contributes to this literature by pointing out that when speculative activity has an
e®ect on real investments, speculators might coordinate on correlated sources of information,
and create excess volatility in prices. In our model, this directly reduces e±ciency.
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25Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: In the proposed equilibrium, (17) must hold for all ~ sc. There-
fore, the coe±cient of ~ sc must be zero. That is:
¿p
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
k
1 + k
+
Ã
¿f + 2¿l +
¡
1 + 1
1+k
¢
¿p
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
!µ
¡¿sk + ¿c
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
¶
¡
¡¿sk + ¿c
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
¡ k = 0:
Substituting for ¿p and rearranging, this equation can be rewritten as:
¡(¿s¿l + (¿f + ¿s + ¿c)(¿f + ¿l + ¿c))k
3 + ¿c (¿l ¡ 2¿s ¡ ¿f ¡ ¿c)k
2 (25)
+¿c (¿c ¡ ¿s)k + ¿
2
c ¡
¿c
¿»
(¿s¿l + (¿f + ¿l)(¿f + ¿s + ¿c))k +
¿2
c ¿l
¿»
= 0:
Next we show that the above cubic equation can be solved for k and has a unique strictly
positive root for k. To see this ¯rst consider the following function:
H (k) = ¡(¿s¿l + (¿f + ¿s + ¿c)(¿f + ¿l + ¿c))k
3 + (¿c¿l ¡ 2¿s¿c ¡ (¿f + ¿c)¿c)k
2(26)
+¿c (¿c ¡ ¿s)k + ¿
2
c :
The discriminant for H (k) = 0 is:
4(¿c¿l ¡ 2¿s¿c ¡ (¿f + ¿c)¿c)
3 ¿
2
c ¡ (¿c¿l ¡ 2¿s¿c ¡ (¿f + ¿c)¿c)
2 ¿
2
c (¿c ¡ ¿s)
2
¡4(¿s¿l + (¿f + ¿s + ¿c)(¿f + ¿l + ¿c))¿
3
c (¿c ¡ ¿s)
3
+18(¿s¿l + (¿f + ¿s + ¿c)(¿f + ¿l + ¿c))(¿c¿l ¡ 2¿s¿c ¡ (¿f + ¿c)¿c)(¿c ¡ ¿s)¿
3
c
+27(¿s¿l + (¿f + ¿s + ¿c)(¿f + ¿l + ¿c))
2 ¿
4
c
which can be rewritten as:
¿
3
c
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
@
32¿4
c ¿f + 64¿4
c ¿l + 91¿3
c ¿2
f + 184¿3
c ¿f¿l + 80¿3
c ¿f¿s + 32¿3
c ¿2
l
+160¿3
c ¿l¿s + 86¿2
c ¿3
f + 174¿2
c ¿2
f¿l + 152¿2
c ¿2
f¿s + 60¿2
c ¿f¿2
l
+326¿2
c ¿f¿l¿s + 72¿2
c ¿f¿2
s + 4¿2
c ¿3
l + 104¿2
c ¿2
l ¿s + 144¿2
c ¿l¿2
s
+27¿c¿4
f + 54¿c¿3
f¿l + 72¿c¿3
f¿s + 27¿c¿2
f¿2
l + 162¿c¿2
f¿l¿s
+68¿c¿2
f¿2
s + 90¿c¿f¿2
l ¿s + 152¿c¿f¿l¿2
s + 28¿c¿f¿3
s
+71¿c¿2
l ¿2
s + 56¿c¿l¿3
s + 4¿2
f¿3
s + 4¿f¿l¿3
s + 4¿f¿4
s + 8¿l¿4
s
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
> 0:
Therefore, the equation H (k) = 0 has a unique real root. Since H (¡1) = 1, H (1) = ¡1
and H (0) = ¿2
c > 0 the only real root occurs for k > 0: Next consider the last two terms of
Equation (25):
¡
¿c
¿»
(¿s¿l + (¿f + ¿l)(¿f + ¿s + ¿c))k +
¿2
c ¿l
¿»
(27)
26Note that when k < 0 Equation (27) is strictly positive, so there can not be a real root of
Equation (25) for k < 0: Moreover, Equation (27) has a strictly negative derivative when
k > 0 so the left side of Equation (25) decreases faster than H (k) and thus crosses zero only
once.
After characterizing k, we note that in the constructed linear equilibrium, the value of g
is given by the following equation:
g = ¡
"
ln
±
c
+
¿f ¹ f + 1
2
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
¡
¿f ¹ f + 1
2
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
+
¡
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1 + 1
1+k
¢
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¢
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
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¶
+
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¿f + 2¿l +
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1 + 1
1+k
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1
2(¿f + ¿s + ¿c)
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¶2
¾
2
l
+
1
2
µ
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1
1 + k
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2
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1
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2
»
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Ã
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¿f + ¿s + ¿c
¡
¿l +
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1
1+k
¢
¿p
¢
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
!
(28)
Finally, we need to establish that a speculator observing a private signal below g ¡ k~ sc
prefers to short sell and a speculator observing a signal above g ¡ k~ sc prefers not to short
sell. Note that the derivative of a speculator's payo® from short selling in (15) with respect
to ~ si is ¿s=(¿f + ¿s + ¿c) times
1
±
exp
µ
¿f ¹ f + ¿s~ si + ¿c~ sc + 1
2
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
+ k~ sc ¡ g +
1
2
¾
2
»
¶
¡
1
c
Ã¡
¿f + 2¿l + ¿p
¡
1 + 1
1+k
¢¢
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
!
exp
0
B
B
B
B
B
@
¿f ¹ f+¿p
k
1+k ~ sc+ 1
2
¿f+¿l+¿p + (¿f+2¿l+¿p(1+ 1
1+k))
¿f+¿l+¿p
³
¿f ¹ f+¿s~ si+¿c~ sc
¿f+¿s+¿c
´
+
µ
¿f+2¿l+(1+ 1
1+k)¿p
¿f+¿l+¿p
¶2
1
2(¿f+¿s+¿c) + 1
2
³
¿l
¿f+¿l+¿p
´2
¾2
l
+1
2
³
¿p
¿f+¿l+¿p
´2 ¡
1
1+k
¢2 ¾2
»
1
C
C
C
C
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A
Note that the above is strictly negative whenever the speculator's payo® is zero for a given
~ si and ~ sc: This implies that for a given ~ sc there is a unique ~ si at which the speculator is
indi®erent between buying the asset or shorting it and that the speculator wants to buy for
~ si above this level and short below it. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2: We plug kBM in the right side of Equation (18) to obtain:
¡
µ
¿s¿l
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
+ (¿f + ¿l + ¿c)
¶µ
¿l¿c
(¿f + ¿s + ¿c)(¿f + ¿l) + ¿l¿s
¶3
+
µ
¿c¿l ¡ ¿s¿c
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
¡ ¿c
¶µ
¿l¿c
(¿f + ¿s + ¿c)(¿f + ¿l) + ¿l¿s
¶2
+¿c
µ
¿c ¡ ¿s
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
¶µ
¿l¿c
(¿f + ¿s + ¿c)(¿f + ¿l) + ¿l¿s
¶
+
¿2
c
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
¿l¿2
c
¿» (¿f + ¿s + ¿c)
µ
¡(¿s¿l + (¿f + ¿l)(¿f + ¿s + ¿c))
(¿f + ¿s + ¿c)(¿f + ¿l) + ¿l¿s
+ 1
¶
27which (after some tedious algebra) can be shown to be strictly positive. Therefore, kBM
is strictly less than the equilibrium weight that the speculators put on the common signal
when the capital provider learns from price. The statement kBM < ¿c=¿s is immediate from
Equation (23). Similarly, to show that k¤ < ¿c=¿s, we plug ¿c=¿s in the right side of Equation
(18) and ¯nd that it is strictly negative. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3: Consider the last two terms in Equation (18):
¡
¿c
¿»
(¿s¿l + (¿f + ¿l)(¿f + ¿s + ¿c))k +
¿2
c ¿l
¿»
:
Denote by k¤ (¿») the equilibrium k for a given ¿»: We want to show that k¤ (¿») is decreasing
in 1=¿»: Take a ¯xed ^ ¿» > 0: Note that the above sum is negative at k = k¤ (^ ¿») (since
k¤ (^ ¿») > ¿l¿c=((¿f + ¿s + ¿c)(¿f + ¿l) + ¿l¿s) by Proposition 2.) As 1=¿» increases this sum
becomes more negative at k = k¤ (^ ¿»). This means that for ¿» > ^ ¿» the value of Equation
(18) is strictly negative at k = k¤ (^ ¿») and thus k¤ (¿») < k¤ (^ ¿»):QED.
Proof of Proposition 4
We start with a lemma:
Lemma 1: The expression
D(k) = ¡3k
2 ((¿l + ¿c + ¿f)(¿c + ¿f + ¿s) + ¿l¿s)
+2¿ck (¿l ¡ 2¿s ¡ ¿f ¡ ¿c) + ¿c (¿c ¡ ¿s) ¡
¿c
¿»
(¿l¿s + (¿l + ¿f)(¿c + ¿f + ¿s))
is negative at k = k¤:
Proof of Lemma 1 We know that Equation (18) crosses zero once and from above so
its derivative with respect to k is negative at k¤: QED
Now we proceed with the proof of Proposition 4. To see @k¤=@¿f < 0 we take the total
derivative of Equation (18) with respect to ¿f to obtain:
@k¤
@¿f
=
k3 (2¿f + 2¿c + ¿l + ¿s) + ¿ck2 + ¿c
k
¿» (2¿f + ¿c + ¿s + ¿l)
D(k)
< 0:
Taking total derivative of Equation (18) with respect to ¿s and using Lemma 1 establishes
that @k¤=@¿s < 0.
Next we show @k¤=@¿l < 0 for small enough ¿f. Taking total derivative of Equation (18)
with respect to ¿l we see that the derivative is given by:
(¿s + (¿c + ¿f + ¿s))k
3 ¡ ¿ck
2 +
¿c
¿»
(¿c + ¿f + 2¿s)k ¡
¿2
c
¿»
28divided by D(k). The numerator is negative if and only if
k >
¿c
2¿s + ¿f + ¿c
:
We directly verify that the value of Equation (18) at ¿c=(2¿s + ¿f + ¿c) is positive if ¿f is
small enough. The last result then again follows from Lemma 1.
Finally, taking total derivative of Equation (18) with respect to ¿c we obtain @k¤=@¿c
equals
"
k3 (2¿c + 2¿f + ¿s + ¿l) + k2 (2¿c + ¿f ¡ ¿l + 2¿s) ¡ k (2¿c ¡ ¿s) ¡ 2¿c
+ k
¿» (¿l¿s + (¿f + ¿l)(2¿c + ¿f + ¿s)) ¡ 2¿c
¿l
¿»
#
=D(k):
Using Equation (18) we can write the numerator as:
1
¿c
·
¡
¡
2¿s¿l + ¿l¿f + ¿s¿f + ¿
2
f
¢
k
3 + ¿
2
c
µ
k
3 + k
2 ¡ k ¡ 1 +
k
¿»
(¿f + ¿l) ¡
¿l
¿»
¶¸
:
Equation (18) evaluated at k = 1 is strictly negative thus in equilibrium k¤ < 1: Moreover
the expression
k
3 + k
2 ¡ k ¡ 1 +
¿l
¿»
(k ¡ 1) < 0
for k 2 (0;1) . Therefore the numerator of @k¤=@¿c is negative for small enough ¿f: Using
Lemma 1 establishes that @k¤=@¿c > 0 for small enough ¿f. QED
29Proof of Proposition 5:
We substitute optimal I into Equation (24) and compute the expectations:
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2 1
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¶
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1
2
exp
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:
Therefore the maximization problem can be viewed as maximizing the following expression
in k :
exp
µ
¿f + 2¿l + 2¿p
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
¶
;
and this is equivalent to maximizing ¿p. Moreover ¿p is increasing for k < ¿c=¿» and decreasing
for k < ¿c=¿» which proves the last statement. QED.
Proof of Proposition 6: Since ¿p =
¡
(1 + k)
2 ¿c¿»
¢
=(k2¿» + ¿c), its maximum is
30achieved when k = ¿c=¿». We plug k = ¿c=¿» in the right side of Equation (18) to obtain:
¡(¿s¿l + (¿f + ¿s + ¿c)(¿f + ¿l + ¿c))
µ
¿c
¿»
¶3
+ ¿c (¿l ¡ 2¿s ¡ ¿f ¡ ¿c)
µ
¿c
¿»
¶2
+¿c (¿c ¡ ¿s)
µ
¿c
¿»
¶
+ ¿
2
c ¡
¿c
¿»
(¿s¿l + (¿f + ¿l)(¿f + ¿s + ¿c))
µ
¿c
¿»
¶
+
¿2
c ¿l
¿»
= ¡
¿2
c
¿3
»
(¿c + ¿»)
¡
¿
2
c + ¿
2
f ¡ ¿
2
» + 2¿c¿f + ¿c¿l + ¿f¿l + ¿c¿s + ¿f¿s + 2¿l¿s ¡ ¿l¿» + ¿s¿»
¢
:
There exists ¹ ¿» such that the above expression is negative for ¿» < ¹ ¿» and positive for ¿» > ¹ ¿».
To see this note that the sign of the above expression is the negative of the sign of the last
part in brackets. It is easy to see that the last part is positive at ¿» = 0; may increase as ¿»
increases at ¯rst but will eventually decrease in ¿» and cross once and for all to the negative
region. Using the logic in the proof of Proposition 1, this establishes the statement in the
proposition. QED.
Proof of Proposition 7: (a) The market clearing price is
P =
1
±
exp
³
(1 + k) ~ f + k¾c~ ²c ¡ g + ~ »
´
;
and its excess volatility is de¯ned as non-fundamental volatility which can be written as the
volatility of the following:
z(P) ¡ ~ f =
g + ln(±P)
1 + k
¡ ~ f =
k
1 + k
¾c~ ²c +
1
1 + k
~ »:
It is straightforward to show that when k = kOP = ¿c=¿», its excess volatility is the lowest
and is
Excess Volatility(Asset Price) =
1
¿c + ¿»
:
The rest of the statement follows immediately. QED.
(b) When k = kOP = ¿c=¿», ¿p = ¿c + ¿». We know that:
I =
1
c
exp
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@
¿f ¹ f + ¿lsl + ¿p
³
~ f + k
1+k¾c~ ²c + 1
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~ »
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1
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1
A:
Take logs on both sides, we obtain:
lnI = ln
µ
1
c
¶
+
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@
¿f ¹ f + ¿lsl + ¿p
³
~ f + k
1+k¾c~ ²c + 1
1+k
~ »
´
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1
2(¿f + ¿l + ¿p)
1
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31We can de¯ne the excess volatility of the real investment as the volatility of the following:
(¿f + ¿l + ¿p)
¡
lnI ¡ ln
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1
c
¢¢
¡ 1
2 ¡ ¿f ¹ f
¿l + ¿p
¡ ~ f =
¿l¾l²l + ¿p
³
k
1+k¾c~ ²c + 1
1+k
~ »
´
¿l + ¿p
It is straightforward to show that when k = kOP = ¿c=¿», ¿p = ¿c + ¿»;and the excess
volatility of the real investment is the lowest which is
Excess Volatility(Real Investment) =
1
¿l + ¿c + ¿»
:
The rest of the statement follows immediately. QED.
Proof of Proposition 8:
Given the adjusted cost of investment solution to capital provider's problem is given by:
I =
E[ ~ FjFl]
cE[ ~ F ¯jFl]
=
1
c
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µ
¿f ¹ f + ¿lsl + ¿pz (P)
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¶
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(1 ¡ ¯2)
2(¿f + ¿l + ¿p)
¶
:
Given the investment policy and the price in (8), we can now write speculator i's expected
pro¯t from buying the asset given the information that is available to her:
E
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(29)
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:
As before, conditional on observing ~ si and ~ sc speculator i believes that ~ f is distributed
normally with mean
¿f
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
¹ f +
¿s
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
~ si +
¿c
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
~ sc
and variance 1=(¿f + ¿s + ¿c). Hence, substituting for z (P) (from (9)) and taking expecta-
tions, Equation (29) can be rewritten as:
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:
32In equilibrium, a speculator who receives a private signal ~ si = g¡k~ sc must be indi®erent
between shorting and buying the asset. That is,
E
h
~ FI ¡ Pj~ si = g ¡ k~ sc; ~ sc
i
= 0: (31)
Substituting ~ si = g¡k~ sc into (30), and taking logs, the indi®erence condition for the marginal
investor becomes:
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:
In a linear equilibrium the above equality must hold for all ~ sc. Therefore, the coe±cient of
~ sc must be zero. That is, the equilibrium k in this case satis¯es the following equation:
¿p
¿f + ¿l + ¿p
k
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¡¡1¡¯
1+k + 1
¢¢
¿p
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µ
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¶
¡
¡¿sk + ¿c
¿f + ¿s + ¿c
¡k = 0:
Rearranging we obtain the following equation for the equilibrium k:
¡(¿s¿l (1 ¡ ¯) + (¿f + ¿l + ¿c)(¿c + ¿f + ¿s))k
3 + ¿c (¿l (1 ¡ ¯) ¡ ¿s (2 ¡ ¯) ¡ ¿f ¡ ¿c)k
2
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2
c (1 ¡ ¯)
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Let
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c ¿l
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:
Thus the equilibrium condition is:
J (k (¯)) ¡ ¯G(k (¯)) = 0: (32)
33From the proof of Proposition 1 we know that J (k) has a unique strictly positive root. Thus
for small enough ¯ (32) has a unique strictly positive root as well. and the equilibrium
without policy intervention is given by k (0) that solves H (k (0)) = 0: It is easy to see that
H (k) = G(k)¡((¿f + ¿l + ¿c)(¿c + ¿f + ¿s))k
3+¿c (¡¿s ¡ ¿f ¡ ¿c)k
2¡
¿c
¿»
((¿f + ¿l)(¿s + ¿c + ¿f))k:
Therefore, G(k (0)) > 0:
Since
@k (¯)
@¯
=
G(k (¯))
H0 (k (¯)) ¡ ¯G0 (k (¯))
and H0 (k (0)) < 0 (from the derivation of equilibrium k (0) without policy intervention) we
see that
@k (0)
@¯
=
G(k (0))
H0 (k (0))
< 0:
Therefore, for ¯ close to zero, a policy with cost of funding positively correlated with the
fundamental (¯ > 0) leads to less coordination among speculators and a policy with the cost
of funding negatively correlated with the fundamental (¯ < 0) leads to more coordination
among speculators. QED.
34